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I. L3Cs SERVE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS
Between 2008 and 2012, three new business models were legally
activated in the United States to facilitate the creation of hybrid
firms.1  While social enterprises have been part of the U.S. economy
for more than a hundred years,2 organizations in the United States
have operated in two very different legal categories: for-profit busi-
nesses and nonprofit charitable organizations.3  Although some com-
panies, such as Goodwill Industries, blend charitable work with
revenue-generating services, they are rare exceptions.4  The advent of
the new legal business models, however, has created strong interest in
businesses that can pursue a dominant social mission.5
One new business model is the low-profit, limited liability company
(L3C).  The L3C was first introduced in Vermont in 2008 and has since
been adopted by several other states.6  The L3C is designed to serve
the for-profit and nonprofit needs of social enterprise within one or-
1. See Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, but Can Tap
Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/
13/business/a-quest-for-hybrid-companies-part-money-maker-part-nonprofit.htm
l?pagewanted=all (describing flexible purpose corporations, L3Cs, and CICs); see
also Anne Field, Benefit Corporations, L3Cs and All the Rest: Making Sense of
Those Confusing Choices, FORBES (May 25, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
annefield/2012/05/25/benefit-corporations-l3cs-and-all-the-rest-making-sense-of-
those-confusing-choices/ (discussing L3Cs and Benefit Corporations (B Corps), as
well as the growing impact and spread of social enterprises).
2. See Matthew F. Doeringer, Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and
International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 293 (2010) (noting that
although “one of the best known social enterprises” in the country was estab-
lished in 1902, similar businesses did not become prominent until the late 1970s
and 1980s because of “economic downturn” and government budget cuts).
3. Id. at 294 (noting the traditional business forms limited companies at either end
of the economic spectrum: nonprofit or for-profit).
4. About Us, GOODWILL INDUSTRIES, http://www.goodwill.org/about-us/ (last visited
June 2, 2013) (explaining that, in addition to its participation in charitable pro-
grams, Goodwill Industries also generates revenue through various commercial
services such as food preparation, shredding, and document imaging).
5. See Leonardo Becchetti, Stefania Di Giacomo & Damiano Pinnacchio, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Corporate Performance: Evidence from a Panel of U.S.
Listed Companies, APPLIED ECON., March 2008, at 541, available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=871402 (finding that dual missions can in-
crease profits for corporations by creating goodwill, attracting socially minded
investors, reducing taxes, insuring against bad publicity, and retaining
employees).
6. Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, Is Social Enterprise the New Corporate Social
Responsibility?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1351, 1362 (2011) (stating that, as of 2008,
Vermont and seven other states have adopted L3C legislation).  The two addi-
tional business forms are the Benefit Corporation and the Flexible Purpose Cor-
poration.  The B Corp establishes the primary mission of a corporation as
maximizing stakeholder value, not simply shareholder value, and requires that a
diverse set of interested parties are included in its decision-making. Id. at
1365–70.
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ganization.7  As such, it has been referred to as a “[f]or-profit with [a]
nonprofit soul.”8  The L3C operates like a nonprofit by primarily pur-
suing a social or charitable mission, but it also functions like a for-
profit company because it generates revenues and distributes the prof-
its to its equity owners.  The L3C model thus enables social entrepre-
neurs to combine funding that would typically be set aside for either
financial investments or charitable donations and allows investors to
seek both a financial and social return on their investment.  This
double bottom line, involving social and financial returns, increases
access to funding not ordinarily available to social entrepreneurs.9
In an effort to efficiently introduce the L3C business model, states
have designed L3C laws under existing LLC regulations.10  The flexi-
bility provided by LLC laws allows an L3C to claim a primary social
mission and avail itself of unique financing tools such as tranche in-
vesting.11  Specifically, the L3C statutes are devised to attract the pro-
gram related investments (PRIs) of charitable foundations.12
Foundations give out billions of dollars every year, and PRIs are a
valuable financing tool that allows social enterprises access to this
money.13  PRI funds can also be used to reduce the risk for other in-
vestors, thereby increasing returns as well as the total funding availa-
ble to social entrepreneurs.14  By design, L3C qualifications mirror the
Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) definition of a PRI-qualified entity,
7. See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by
Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 244 (2010) (defining the features of the
L3C business model).
8. Carol Coren & Robert M. Lang, The L3C: The For-Profit with the Nonprofit Soul,
BRIDGES (Winter 2009), available at http://stlouisfed.org/publications/br/articles/
?id=1848 (suggesting that capitalism offers a market that can solve both the so-
cial and economic problems of the world).
9. See Robert R Keatinge, LLCs and Nonprofit Organizations—For-Profits, Non-
profits, and Hybrids, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 553, 582 (2009) (stating that an L3C
is merely a definitional addition to LLC statutes).
10. See Andrew M. Wolk, Social Entrepreneurship and Government: A New Breed of
Entrepreneurs Developing Solutions to Social Problems, SMALL BUS. ECON., 2007,
at 151, 201, available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/sbe_07_ch06.pdf.
11. See id. (arguing that tranche investing could lower the risk of investing in L3Cs
for certain investors and therefore increase the overall funding available for
L3Cs).
12. See Anne Field, IRS Rule Could Help the Fledging L3C Corporate Form, FORBES
(May 4, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/05/04/irs-rules-could-
help-the-fledgling-l3c/ (stating that new changes to the PRI IRS guidelines could
open up significant funding not previously available to social enterprises).
13. See Highlights of Foundation Yearbook, FOUND. CENTER (Dec. 2011), http://
foundationcenter.org/gainknowledge/research/pdf/fy2011_highlights.pdf (using
pie charts to show that approximately 2,733 corporate foundations in the U.S.
awarded $4.7 billion in grants in 2009).
14. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 622 (2010) (stating that L3Cs are designed to make it
easier and less costly for for-profit firms to obtain IRS-approved funding from
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making this business model an attractive recipient of PRI funds.15
However, neither the IRS nor the federal government has provided
formal notification that L3Cs will receive preferential consideration,16
and L3C advocates have thus proposed federal legislation that would
enable L3Cs to receive preferential designation as presumptively PRI-
qualified organizations.17
An L3C’s access to large-scale funding allows it to develop a busi-
ness that is both long-term and self-sufficient, unlike charities that
are often dependent on annual refunding processes to sustain their
operations.18  The L3C model’s focus on a double bottom line and
tranche investing “gives many social enterprises a low enough cost of
capital that they are able to be self sustainable,” therefore making it
“[a] perfect vehicle for economic development, medical research, oper-
ation of social service agencies, museums, concert venues, housing and
any other activity with both a charitable purpose and a revenue
stream.”19
The creation of the L3C form was accompanied by high expecta-
tions that it could benefit some struggling businesses.20  For example,
in 2010, the North Carolina Legislature justified the passage of L3C
legislation by arguing the hybrid model would help reinvigorate a
stagnant state economy.21  By mid-2012, forty-seven companies incor-
nonprofit foundations); Field, supra note 12 (commenting that the Gates Founda-
tion set up a $100 million PRI fund in late 2010).
15. CHRISTOPHER REINHART, OLR RESEARCH REPORT NO. 2011-R-0344, LOW-PROFIT
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES OR L3CS (2011), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/
2011/rpt/2011-R-0344.htm (describing how L3C statutes have been designed to
mirror the requirements for an entity to receive a PRI).
16. See id. (discussing arguments against L3Cs in Connecticut, including the lack of a
preferential IRS ruling).
17. See Malika Zouhali-Worrall, For L3C Companies, Profit Isn’t the Point,
CNNMONEY (Feb. 9, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/02/08/smallbusiness/l3c_
low_profit_companies/ (“L3C proponents . . . are courting potential sponsors on
Capitol Hill for a federal bill.”).
18. Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 13,
2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-
charitable-for-profit-entity/ (stating that L3Cs, unlike charities, can turn a profit
and distribute these profits to their investors).
19. Ams. for Cmty. Dev., What Is the L3C?, INTEGRATED CARE MGMT., http://www.
icm3.org/_PDFs/L3C.pdf (last visited June 2, 2013) [hereinafter What is the L3C?]
(describing how enabling socially responsible businesses to turn a profit makes
them more self-sustaining in the long term).
20. Robert Lang, The L3C and Economic Development, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY
DEV., http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/The%20L
3C%20&%20Economic%20Development.pdf (last visited June 2, 2013) [hereinaf-
ter Lang, The L3C and Economic Development] (discussing how the L3C could
bring much-needed capital investments to the struggling newspaper industry).
21. S.B. 91, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007), available at http://www.ncga.state.
nc.us/Sessions/2007/Bills/Senate/PDF/S91v5.pdf (stating that the use of L3Cs
would help improve the struggling North Carolina manufacturing economy).
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porated as L3Cs in North Carolina, giving L3C supporters hope for
even greater business growth in the upcoming years.22
Despite these successes, adoption of the L3C form has been slower
than proponents expected.  Some critics argue that L3Cs are nothing
more than “specifically branded LLCs” and that the novelty of this
new business form leaves its benefits and consequences shrouded in
uncertainty.23  With little state or federal governance, many questions
remain regarding investor rights, securities trading, fiduciary duties,
and profit distributions.  Despite these criticisms and uncertainties,
several states have passed L3C laws, and an increasing number of bus-
iness are adopting this model.24
A similar business initiative has found great success in the United
Kingdom (U.K.), where numerous proponents supported legislation
designed to create hybrid business models that would promote social
entrepreneurship.25  As a result, the U.K. created the Community In-
terest Company (CIC) in 2006, allowing more than 4,500 companies to
register as CICs that offer a double bottom line (or dual benefit) to
investors.26  Companies adopting the CIC model have ranged from
one-person startups to well-established multimillion dollar compa-
nies.27  The CIC model operates in a wide range of economic sectors,
including agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, construction, hotels, ed-
ucation, and health services sectors.28
22. See Corporation Search, N.C. DEPT. OF SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.secretary.
state.nc.us/corporations/searchresults.aspx?onlyactive=OFF&Words=ANY&
searchstr=L3C (last visited July 15, 2012); see also Our Story, FIBERACTIVE OR-
GANICS, http://www.fiberactiveorganics.com/our-story/ (last visited June 2, 2013)
(stating that Fiberactive Organics was originally incorporated as an LLC and
later converted to an L3C that manufactures custom clothes, quilts, linens, and
other assorted items while promoting organic farming).
23. See Bishop, supra note 7, at 244 (arguing L3Cs are unnecessary because every-
thing an L3C can do an LLC can already accomplish).
24. Laws, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcommunityde
velopment.org/laws.html (last visited June 2, 2013) [hereinafter Laws] (listing
nine states and two federal jurisdictions that have adopted L3C legislation).
25. See Doeringer, supra note 2, at 307 (stating there are nearly two million social
enterprises operating in Europe).
26. REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST CO., DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS,
ANNUAL REPORT, 2010, (U.K.) available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/
news/Annual%20Report/Annual%20Report%202009-10-%20Final.pdf  [hereinaf-
ter REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT 2010]  (stating that between 2009 and 2010,
there were roughly 131 applications for CIC classification per month).
27. REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST CO., THE CIC REGULATOR CASE STUDY SERIES:
THE EXPERT PATIENTS PROGRAMME, (U.K.) available at http://www.cicregulator.
gov.uk/The%20Expert%20Patients%20Programme-ver0.1.pdf [hereinafter REGU-
LATOR, CASE STUDY SERIES] (stating that the Expert Patients Programme em-
ploys 1500 staff members and has £7.5 million of income a year).
28. REGULATOR, ANNUAL REPORT 2010, supra note 26, at 12 (discussing the wide
range of businesses that CICs currently operate).
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While CICs and L3Cs were created with the same double bottom
line in mind, CICs face strict government regulations that provide in-
vestors with additional protections.  These regulations have indirectly
contributed to the success of many CICs by increasing investor confi-
dence in the success of these businesses.29  In the United States, the
flexibility of LLC statutes may provide L3Cs with unique funding op-
tions, but the lack of government regulation leaves investor outcomes
uncertain and inhibits L3Cs from being a better-utilized business
model for social entrepreneurship.
II. SOCIAL VENTURES AND L3Cs
While the L3C business form is still in its introductory stage, there
are examples of social entrepreneurs taking advantage of the business
model and the L3C brand to attract new investors.  In February 2012,
Renewable Social Benefit Funds, “an alternative energy company fo-
cused exclusively on bringing solar power to hospitals, schools, low-
income housing projects and other governmental and tax-exempt enti-
ties,” announced a collaboration with Panasonic Enterprise Solutions
Company and the Conrad N. Hilton Foundation to provide a solar
power installation on the Hilton Foundation’s corporate campus.30
The Hilton Foundation stated that working with “Renewable Social
Benefit Funds’ financing will allow [it] to allocate assets to other char-
itable purposes, a double win for the Foundation.”31  This collabora-
tion enables the Hilton Foundation to take advantage of Renewable
Social Benefit Funds’ L3C business model and “lower [its] carbon
footprint.”32
Another business that has successfully used the L3C’s unique fi-
nancing model is the Paradigm Project, a company dedicated “to
creat[ing] sustainable social, economic and environmental value
29. See REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST CO., GUIDANCE CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 3,
available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/bispartners/cicregulator/docs/guidance/
11-950-community-interest-companies-guidance-chapter-1-introduction (last up-
dated Dec. 2010) (stating that the government regulation helps protect public
confidence in CICs by ensuring that they follow the law).
30. See Panasonic and Renewable Social Benefit Funds Team to Bring Solar Power
Capability to Conrad N. Hilton Foundation’s New Campus, PRNEWSWIRE (Feb.
28, 2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/panasonic-and-renewable-
social-benefit-funds-team-to-bring-solar-power-capability-to-conrad-n-hilton-
foundations-new-campus-140721673.html [hereinafter PRNEWSWIRE, Hilton
Foundation] (describing the collaboration between the Hilton Foundation and Re-
newable Social Benefit Funds, a Colorado-based L3C).
31. Id. (describing how the project will be financed and indicating the use of a PRI by
the foundation).
32. Id. (setting forth the reasons for the collaboration, including reducing the cam-
pus’s carbon footprint and promoting environmentally responsible habits).
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within developing world communities.”33  The Paradigm Project com-
bines grants, low-interest loans, charitable donations, and traditional
market investments to fund its various projects, including the market-
ing of affordable, energy-efficient stoves in Kenya, Guatemala, and
Haiti.34  Through partnerships with nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), charitable organizations, social capital partners, and inves-
tors, the Paradigm Project has distributed over 36,000 energy efficient
stoves in developing countries across the globe.35
A. The Development of the LLC
Since 1990, market demands for more diverse and flexible business
arrangements resulted in dramatic changes in traditional business
forms that exceeded the original flexibility allowed under corporate
and partnership law.36  The first LLC statute was passed in Wyoming
in 1977; however, widespread adoption of the LLC business form was
stagnant until the IRS officially classified the LLC as a partnership
for federal income tax purposes in 1988.37  As a result of this classifi-
33. The Paradigm Project Featured at Clinton Global Initiative, PRNEWSWIRE (Sep-
tember 20, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-paradigm-pro
ject-featured-at-clinton-global-initiative-103269839.html [hereinafter PRNEW-
SWIRE, Clinton Global Initiative] (“The Paradigm Project is a low-profit, limited
liability company (L3C) whose mission is to create sustainable economic, social
and environmental value within developing world communities . . . .  Their desire
to create a lasting, positive impact on these communities was the impetus for the
creation of a unique model that combines best practices from market driven and
philanthropic sectors to deliver sustainable change . . . .”); see also About Us,
Levering Carbon Offsets on Behalf of the Poor, PARADIGM PROJECT, http://www.
theparadigmproject.org/about-us/ (last visited June 2, 2013) [hereinafter PARA-
DIGM PROJECT, Levering Carbon Offsets] (describing how initial project funding
for the Paradigm Project is derived from a “mix of investor and donor capital,
which covers costs until the carbon revenue makes the project self-sustainable”).
34. See PARADIGM PROJECT, Levering Carbon Offsets, supra note 33; Current and Fu-
ture Projects, PARADIGM PROJECT (Dec. 20, 2011), http://theparadigmproject.org/
our-stoves-in-kenya/ [hereinafter PARADIGM PROJECT, Current and Future
Projects]; see also PRNEWSWIRE, Clinton Global Initiative, supra note 33 (describ-
ing the current and future business plans for the Paradigm Project as of 2010).
35. See Our Commitment, PARADIGM PROJECT, http://www.theparadigmproject.org/
our-commitment (last visited June 2, 2013) [hereinafter PARADIGM PROJECT, Our
Commitment] (describing the organization’s mission to deliver five million energy
efficient stoves in developing countries by 2020).
36. See J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, “They’ve Created a Lamb with Mandi-
bles of Death”: Secrecy, Disclosure, and Fiduciary Duties in Limited Liability
Firms, 76 IND. L.J. 271, 272 (2001) (stating that traditional business forms have
been reworked to make new forms such as the LLC, Limited Liability Partner-
ship (LLP), and the Limited Liability Limited Partnership (LLLP)).
37. Thomas E. Rutledge & Lady E. Booth, The Limited Liability Company Act: Un-
derstanding Kentucky’s New Organizational Option, 83 KY. L.J. 1, 64 (1995)
(describing the proliferation of the LLC business model after the IRS’s 1988 rul-
ing, which classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes).
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cation, the LLC was able to combine limited liability and favorable tax
benefits into one business form.38
Statutory developments have curtailed the unique limited liability
protections of the LLC and have rendered it a less desirable business
model.39  For example, LLC members have been held personally liable
for pre-formation transactions, post-dissolution transactions, acts
other than as an owner, improper purposes, wrongful distributions,
and professional obligation violations.40  However, the developments
in LLC law have also created a flexible and fluid business form that is
used for many purposes and serves the needs of businesses ranging
from one-person operations to multi-billion dollar international
companies.41
B. Legislative History and Passage of the L3C
The flexible nature of the LLC has made it amenable to expansions
and statutory modifications in order to create hybrid business forms.42
North Carolina was the first state to propose amending its LLC laws
to allow the establishment of L3Cs.43  In 2007, Senator Jim Jacumin
sponsored Senate Bill 91, the Endangered Manufacturing and Jobs
Act, which included provisions allowing the creation of an L3C.44  Al-
though S.B. 91 did not survive the legislative session, L3Cs eventually
38. Thomas E. Rutledge, Limited Liability (Or Not): Reflections on the Holy Grail, 51
S.D. L. REV. 417, 422 (2006) (arguing that the LLC combines the best features of
corporate law and partnerships to create a powerful tax-planning business form).
39. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 36, at 272–73 (noting that all fifty states have
adopted LLC legislation and LLC statutes are being constantly reworked and
amended); Rutledge, supra note 38, at 430. (setting forth statutory and judicial
restraints on the limited liability of LLCs and their individual members).
40. Rutledge, supra note 38, at 430 (stating that individual LLC members can be
found personally liable for a multitude of violations and that the principle of
“piercing the corporate veil” has been applied in order to hold individual members
accountable for egregious conduct).
41. See Matthew G. Dore, What, Me Worry?  Tort Liability Risks for Participants in
LLCs, 11 U.C. DAVIS. BUS. L.J. 267, 269 (2011) (discussing the widespread use
and acceptance of LLCs and indicating they have surpassed traditional corpora-
tions as the preferred business entity).
42. See Heather Sertial, Note, Hybrid Entities: Distributing Profits with a Purpose,
17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 282 (2012) (discussing how the flexibility of
the LLC’s governance structure can benefit the L3C’s social agenda).
43. S.B. 308, Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009), available at http://www.ncga.
state.nc.us/Sessions/2009/Bills/Senate/PDF/S308v5.pdf.
44. N.C. S.B. 91, supra note 21 (arguing that L3Cs would help improve North Caro-
lina’s struggling manufacturing industry).  The Endangered Manufacturing and
Jobs Act, or S.B. 91, sets forth a list of reasons for the introduction of L3Cs. Id.
Specifically, S.B. 91 states that overseas competition damaged the North Caro-
lina furniture industry and L3Cs could help stimulate job creation and attract
investors and other funding in order to revitalize the furniture industry. Id.  S.B.
91 also states that the benefits of L3Cs merging with the furniture industry would
strengthen the overall economy of North Carolina. Id.
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became a reality in North Carolina in 2010 with the passage of Senate
Bill 308.45
Senate Bill 308 defines an L3C as an LLC that is formed for both
business and charitable purposes.46  However, an L3C is considered a
for-profit company for any tax issue.47  To satisfy the charitable pur-
pose requirements of the statute, an L3C must be set up “[t]o accom-
plish one or more charitable or educational purposes within the
meaning of section 170(c)(2)(B) of the Code, as defined in G.S. 105-
228.90.”48  In addition, the L3C must operate in such a manner that
“no significant purpose of the company is the production of income or
the appreciation of property.”49  However, production of “significant
income . . . is not, in the absence of other factors, conclusive evidence
of a significant purpose to produce income or accumulate capital.”50
The L3C also must operate in such a way “that no purpose of the com-
pany is to accomplish . . . [any] political or legislative purposes within
the meaning of section 170(c)(2)(D) of the Code, as defined in G.S. 105-
228.90.”51
The North Carolina L3C statute sets forth the requirements of an
L3C’s articles of incorporation.52  The statute also states that the
name of any low-profit limited liability company must contain the
words “low-profit limited liability company” or the abbreviation
“L3C.”53  If at any time the L3C fails to meet the requirements of the
45. See N.C. S.B. 308, supra note 43.
46. Id. (“[An L3C] is formed for both a business purpose and a charitable purpose that
requires operation of the company in accordance with the requirements of this
subsection.”).
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., EXEMPT PURPOSES—INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE SECTION 501(c)(3), available at http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Nonprofits/
Charitable-Organizations/Exempt-Purposes-Internal-Revenue-Code-Section-501
(c)(3) (defining the term “charitable” as “used in its generally accepted legal sense
and includes relief of the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged; advance-
ment of religion; advancement of education or science; erecting or maintaining
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of government; les-
sening neighborhood tensions; eliminating prejudice and discrimination; defend-
ing human and civil rights secured by law; and combating community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency.”).
49. See N.C. S.B. 308, supra note 43.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE RESTRICTION OF POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
INTERVENTION BY SECTION 501(c)(3) TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, available at
http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Nonprofits/Charitable-Organizations/The-Re
striction-of-Political-Campaign-Intervention-by-Section-501%28c%29%283%29-
Tax-Exempt-Organizations (“Under the Internal Revenue Code, all section
501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly par-
ticipating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposi-
tion to) any candidate for elective public office.”).
52. N.C. S.B. 308, supra note 43.
53. Id.
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statute, the L3C will no longer be able to use the L3C name but will
remain a fully functional LLC.54
Although North Carolina was the first state to propose an L3C stat-
ute, Vermont was the first state to actually enact such a statute.55
Vermont’s L3C statute is very similar to the original North Carolina
legislation, although one significant difference between the two is that
the Vermont statute requires that an L3C can only be created when it
maintains a “relationship to the accomplishment of charitable or edu-
cational purposes.”56  The laws are also similar in that the Vermont
statute provides that if at any time an L3C fails to satisfy any require-
ment, it shall immediately cease to be a low-profit LLC and will exist
only as an LLC.57
C. Current Legal Landscape of L3Cs
Since 2008, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina,
Rhode Island, Utah, Wyoming, and two Indian nations have enacted
L3C legislation.58  As of June 2013, L3C statutes have been proposed
in twenty-seven additional states.59  Additionally, an increasing num-
ber of businesses are utilizing the L3C model.  For example, Vermont
had 185 registered L3Cs as of June 2013, less than five years after it
54. See, e.g., N.C. S.B. 91, supra note 21 (stating that “if an entity that met this
definition at its formation at any time ceases to satisfy any one of the foregoing
requirements, it shall immediately cease to be a low-profit limited liability com-
pany but will continue to exist as a limited liability company.”).
55. H.B. 775, Gen. Assemb., 2007–08 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2008) (codified at VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 3001 (West 2009)).
56. Id. (defining an L3C as a business that “significantly furthers the accomplishment
of one or more charitable or educational purposes” and “would not have been
formed but for the company’s relationship to the accomplishment of charitable or
educational purposes”).
57. Id. (stating that failure to comply with the state’s L3C statute will result in imme-
diate revocation of the L3C designation).
58. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-5 (West 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301
(West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 1502 (West 2009) (effective July 1,
2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4102(2)(m) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 48-2c-102 (West 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (West 2009); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 17-29-102 (West 2010); see also Laws, supra note 24 (listing Illinois, Loui-
siana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Wyoming, the Oglala
Sioux Tribe, and the Crow Indian Nation of Montana as jurisdictions that have
adopted L3C legislation).
59. John Tyler, Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework
for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, n.1 (2010) (not-
ing that as of 2009, five states and two Indian nations passed L3C laws and eight
other states, including Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, and Virginia,
were considering similar legislation); see also Considering Legislation in Your
State?, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., http://www.americansforcommunityde
velopment.org/considering.html (last visited July 3, 2013) (listing a total of
twenty-seven states where L3C legislation has been written).
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authorized the use of L3Cs.60  By the summer of 2013, there were 490
L3Cs registered in Illinois, Michigan, North Carolina, Utah, and Wyo-
ming and over 850 L3Cs registered nationally.61
II. SOURCES OF L3C FUNDING
Social business ventures provide goods and services where govern-
ments, traditional for-profit companies, and nonprofits have not met
market and social demands.62  However, social business ventures
have not always had access to the same financing options enjoyed by
for-profit and nonprofit organizations.63  The L3C structure was thus
developed to allow companies to gain access to financing and invest-
ments not previously available to social business ventures, including
venture capitalists, angel investors, foundation grants, and PRIs.64
L3Cs provide three unique features to increase funding to social
entrepreneurships.  First, the L3C structure was created to accommo-
date PRIs, which is the main vehicle used by charitable foundations to
make high-risk investments.65  Second, the flexibility of LLC statutes
allows L3Cs to use tranche investing so that the L3C can offer different
rates of return for different investors.66  Third, the branding of the
L3C as a new and reliable business form is tailored to increase the
trust of investors interested in funding dual mission companies.67
A. Program-Related Investments
Grant-making foundations are key players in nonprofit financing,
even though the IRS has imposed restrictions on how these private,
60. R.I. GEN. LAWS. ANN. § 7-16-76 (West 2012) (effective July 1, 2012); see also
Here’s the Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, http://www.intersectorl3c.
com/l3c_tally.html (last updated June 25, 2013) (listing approximately 850 regis-
tered L3Cs in the United States as of June 2013).
61. See INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, supra note 60.
62. Mukesh Sud, Craig V. VanSandt & Amanda M. Baugous, Social Entrepreneur-
ship: The Role of Institutions, 85 J. BUS. ETHICS 201, 202–09 (2009) (discussing
how the current makeup of social entrepreneurship has failed to meet the needs
of society).
63. Id. at 203 (noting that each type of business venture has historically been limited
to specific types of funding).
64. See Lang, The L3C and Economic Development, supra note 20 (discussing how
tranche investing may make available different types of potential L3C investors).
65. Id. (noting that L3C statutes were specifically designed to open up access to
PRIs).
66. Id. (noting that PRIs are the most at risk investment in L3Cs, but their contribu-
tion makes L3C investment more attractive to other investors because it “take[s]
much of the risk out of the venture” by “improving the credit rating and lowering
the cost of capital”).
67. Id. (arguing that hybrid business forms need specific branding in order to in-
crease investor security and trust).
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tax-exempt foundations can spend their money.68  In order for a pri-
vate foundation to keep its tax-exempt status, it is required to expend
a certain percentage of its assets every year for charitable purposes.69
The percentage a private foundation must expend is determined
through a complex formula, but generally a foundation will be re-
quired to expend nearly five percent of the fair market value of its
assets each year.70
If a foundation “invests any amount in such a manner as to jeop-
ardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes,” § 4944 of the
Internal Revenue Code imposes a 10% tax of the amount invested dur-
ing each year of the taxable period.71  Jeopardizing investments are
investments that are “unduly risky”72 or investments in which man-
agers “have failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence . . .
in providing for the long- and short-term financial needs of the foun-
dation . . . .”73  If the questionable investment is not removed from
jeopardy within the tax year, an additional 25% tax is imposed on the
foundation.74  Congress, by exempting PRIs from the set of jeopardiz-
ing investments, clearly created an exception to the general rule that
foundations can only invest in nonprofits.75  PRIs thus count as part of
the required distribution percentage that private foundations must
expend for charitable purposes annually, and they do not subject the
private foundation to the costly excise taxes that are placed on jeop-
ardizing investments.76
To qualify as a PRI, a foundation’s investment must satisfy three
requirements.77  The first is the charitable-purpose test, which man-
68. See Michael D. Gottesman, Comment, From Cobblestones to Pavement: The Legal
Road Forward for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 345, 348–49 (2007) (noting the funding problems that face nonprofits
and arguing that a hybrid business form could help these social enterprises tap
into the large financial support of foundations).
69. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 622 (noting that PRIs qualify toward the required
annual distribution).
70. Id. (“[The] percentage private foundations must expend for charitable purposes
. . . . is determined using a relatively complex formula.”).
71. I.R.C. § 4944(a)(2) (West 2006) (imposing a 10% tax on managers who knowingly
and willfully participate in making an investment that jeopardizes a charitable
purpose).
72. See Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limita-
tions, 58 TAX L. REV. 59, 66 (2004) (discussing the statutory history of I.R.C.
§ 4944 and jeopardizing investments, including Congress’s legislative intent, the
penalties the statute imposes, any exceptions to the penalties, and the surpris-
ingly small number of disputes arising under this provision).
73. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2) (1973).
74. I.R.C. § 4944(b)(1).
75. See Gottesman, supra note 68, at 349–50 (noting that Congress enabled PRIs in
1972 to add flexibility to foundation investments and distributions).
76. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 622 (noting that a foundation must distribute a
certain amount of its assets each year).
77. I.R.C. § 4944(c).
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dates that the investment “significantly furthers the accomplishment
of the private foundation’s exempt activities and [that] the investment
would not have been made but for such relationship between the in-
vestment and the accomplishment of the foundation’s exempt activi-
ties.”78  The second requirement, the income-production test, specifies
that the production of income or appreciation of property may not be a
significant purpose of the investment.79  The third requirement, the
political- and lobbying-expense test, specifies that a primary purpose
may not be influencing legislation or taking part in political cam-
paigns on behalf of candidates.80
“Program-related investments” is a term applied uniquely to those
investments made by nonprofit, tax-exempt private foundations81 to
for-profit companies whose activities help accomplish the foundations’
social missions.82  For example, “a foundation that aims to expand af-
fordable housing might lend money to a housing development com-
pany” and, if the housing development company succeeds financially,
then the foundation could receive some financial return on its invest-
ment.83  While no federal law or IRS rule requires a foundation to get
IRS approval before making a program-related investment,84 it could
be costly for the foundation to not seek early IRS approval if the in-
vestment is later determined to be a jeopardizing investment that sub-
jects the foundation to excise taxes.85  As alternatives, a foundation
has two primary options available to aid in determining whether a
specific investment qualifies as a PRI.  First, the foundation can con-
sult published IRS letter rulings on PRIs; however, IRS rulings about
PRIs are extremely rare.86  The foundation can also ask the IRS for a
private letter ruling (PLR) on whether an investment in a specific L3C
qualifies as a PRI.87  This may, however, be an impractical alternative
78. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (2013).
79. I.R.C. § 4944(c).
80. See 26 C.F.R § 53.4944-3(a)(1)(iii) (2013).
81. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 622 (describing the development and use of PRIs).
82. See Gottesman, supra note 68, at 349–50 (stating PRIs are used to help a founda-
tion accomplish its social mission by providing funding to third parties).
83. Id. at 350 (describing how a foundation may use a PRI and still receive a return
on its investment).
84. See Robert Lang, PRIs and Private Letter Rulings, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY
DEV., http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/PRIsAnd
PrivateLetterRulings.pdf (last visited July 14, 2013)  [hereinafter Lang, Private
Letter Rulings] (stating foundations can currently make PRIs to L3Cs without the
IRS’s approval).
85. See I.R.C. § 4944 (West 2010) (setting forth the excise taxes on jeopardizing
investments).
86. See Bishop, supra note 7, at 260.
87. See UNDERSTANDING IRS GUIDANCE —A BRIEF PRIMER, INTERNAL REVENUE SER-
VICE (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-
Brief-Primer (“A private letter ruling, or PLR, is a written statement issued to a
taxpayer that interprets and applies tax laws to the taxpayer’s specific set of
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for many foundations because PLRs are typically expensive and often
take substantial time to obtain.88  PLRs thus appear to be an option
that few foundations are willing or able to utilize in determining
whether an investment qualifies as a PRI.89
While the L3C was created to be a viable vehicle to receive the PRIs
of foundations,90 senior IRS agent, Ron Schultz recently expressed
concern over foundations making PRIs to L3Cs.91  Schultz warned that
the IRS is still undergoing a process to determine the tax conse-
quences of L3Cs.92  He noted that “at the federal level, no one has re-
ally signed off” on whether a private foundation’s investment in an
L3C qualifies as a PRI.93  He further urged caution by foundations
looking to make PRIs in L3Cs, stating that if “you think the jeopardy
investment issue is a slam dunk and you don’t need to concern your-
self with it, that would be premature.”94
facts.  A PLR is issued to establish with certainty the federal tax consequences of
a particular transaction before the transaction is consummated or before the tax-
payer’s return is filed.  A PLR is issued in response to a written request submit-
ted by a taxpayer and is binding on the IRS if the taxpayer fully and accurately
described the proposed transaction in the request and carries out the transaction
as described.  A PLR may not be relied on as precedent by other taxpayers or IRS
personnel.  PLRs are generally made public after all information has been re-
moved that could identify the taxpayer to whom it was issued.”).
88. See Lang, Private Letter Rulings, supra note 84 (describing the high legal costs
associated with PLRs).
89. In 2006, a survey of more than 72,000 foundations was conducted to determine
how often they use PRIs.  The results showed the foundations made aggregate
qualifying distributions of $43 billion but that PRIs only accounted for 1% of
these distributions. Aggregate Data by Private Foundation Type, 2006, FOUND.
CENTER, (2008), available at http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/statistics/
pdf/01_found_fin_data/2006/02_06.pdf.  Traditionally, private foundations limit
their use of PRIs because of the risk of the IRS ruling that the PRIs were jeopard-
izing investments. Id.  See also Michael D. Martin, Donor Advised Funds and the
L3C; “Shall We Dance?”, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEV., available at http://
www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/TDE_CMS/database/userfiles/Do-
nor%20Advised%20Funds%20and%20The%20L3C.pdf (stating PRIs typically
comprise 1–5% of a foundation’s annual distributions); Robert Lang, Philan-
thropic Facilitation Act of 2010, (2010), available at http://www.americansforcom-
munitydevelopment.org/downloads/PhilanthropicFacilitationAct2010.pdf
[hereinafter Lang, Philanthropic Facilitation Act] (proposing federal legislation
to ease the potential burden of making a PRI to an L3C).
90. See Lang, Philanthropic Facilitation Act, supra note 89, at 1 (stating that only 5%
of private foundations make PRIs of any kind).
91. See Diane Freda, IRS Tax-Exempt Official Urges Caution for Groups Eyeing Low-
Profit LLC Investment, BNA DAILY TAX REP., No. 126, at G-3 (July 6, 2009) (set-
ting forth potential problems with foundations relying on L3Cs to make PRIs).
92. See id. (noting there is no federal regulation giving special treatment to L3Cs, and
they are treated as any other LLC).
93. See id. (discussing the dangers of ignoring jeopardizing investment issues with
L3Cs).
94. Id.
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When a foundation makes an investment in an L3C, there is no
guarantee that the investment will qualify as a PRI.95  A foundation
needs to make sure that any specific PRI made to an L3C furthers the
foundation’s charitable purposes because an investment in an L3C
might qualify as a PRI for one foundation but as a jeopardizing invest-
ment for another.96  Therefore, unless this uncertainty is reduced by
changes to state and federal law, it is unlikely that L3Cs will receive
significant funding from foundations in the form of PRIs due to the
risks associated with such investments.
B. Proposed Federal PRI Legislation
Proponents of the L3C have pushed for changes in federal law that
would resolve the issues faced by foundations that wish to invest PRIs
in L3Cs.97  The Philanthropic Facilitation Act (PFA) of 2010 proposes
amendments to the IRS Code and the Treasury regulations in order to
increase the use of PRIs by allowing private foundations to invest in
L3Cs more efficiently and effectively.98  However, the proposed legisla-
tion has not received federal support and may not be passed by Con-
gress.99  While the PFA is not essential for the survival of L3Cs, the
legislation would enable the L3C to become a more viable business
model for social entrepreneurs.
The PFA proposes to amend § 4944(c) of the IRS Code to provide
for a voluntary procedure through which an L3C or foundation could
ask the IRS for a ruling on whether or not an investment qualifies as a
PRI.100  This voluntary pre-approval process would be similar to the
process for recognizing a § 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization, and the
time and cost of the determination would likely be equivalent to the
time and cost for a § 501(c)(3) tax exempt status determination.101  If
the IRS ruled that an investment qualified as a PRI, then all private
foundations with common purposes could rely on this determination
95. See id.
96. See C.F.R. § 53.4944-3(a)(2)(i) (2013).
97. See Lang, Philanthropic Facilitation Act, supra note 89.  The Americans for Com-
munity Development, an organization founded by Robert Lang to help support
the continued growth and creation of L3Cs, designed, drafted, and proposed three
pieces of legislation: 1) The Program-Related Promotion Act of 2008; 2) The Pro-
gram-Related Promotion Act of 2009; and 3) the Philanthropic Facilitation Act of
2010. Id.
98. See id.
99. See Matt Doeringer, Reevaluating the L3C: Mistaken Assumptions and Potential
Solutions, PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTARISM, AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT MANAGEMENT PA-
PER SERIES, DUKE UNIVERSITY, May 3, 2010, at 17, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1696267.
100. See Lang, Philanthropic Facilitation Act, supra note 89, at 8–10.
101. See Elizabeth Schmidt, Vermont’s Social Hybrid Pioneers: Early Observations
and Questions to Ponder, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 163, 170 (2010) (arguing a pre-approval
process would facilitate more PRIs).
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when making investments to that specific entity until the IRS pub-
lished a notice of revocation.102  In addition to the voluntary pre-ap-
proval process, the PFA also seeks amendments to § 4944(c) that
would clarify that PRIs are not jeopardizing investments.103
The PFA also proposes that the Treasury regulations be amended
to clarify that a PRI is a qualified distribution and that PRIs are ex-
cluded from the Code’s definition of a business holding.104  In addi-
tion, the PFA seeks to have the Treasury regulations include
examples of investments in an L3C that would qualify as PRIs, invest-
ments that would not qualify, and investments that initially would
qualify but, due to a change in circumstances, would later not qual-
ify.105  The PFA also seeks guidance from the Treasury regulations on
how a private foundation could divest itself of a PRI that no longer
qualifies.106  Finally, the PFA proposes requiring L3Cs to disclose a
significant amount of financial information to the public.107  The
PFA’s creators state that requiring financial disclosures, increasing
federal regulation, and providing further clarification on PRIs, will
give investors more confidence in L3Cs.108
The PFA supports its requests for these amendments with a vari-
ety of arguments.  The PFA first contends that more entities may take
advantage of the L3C format if PRI rules are clarified.109  It also ar-
gues that L3Cs are an excellent alternative business vehicle for non-
profit ventures in a variety of struggling industries such as
newspapers, magazines, radio stations, broadcast news, and auto
manufacturers because the L3C model could allow these companies to
make use of private foundation money without abandoning for-profit
funding.110  In addition, the PFA states that L3Cs are more stable eco-
nomic business entities than are nonprofits because L3Cs can utilize
both for-profit and private foundation investors.111
102. See id. (stating that “private foundations could then rely on this determination
unless and until the Secretary of the Treasury published a notice of revocation”).
103. See Lang, Philanthropic Facilitation Act, supra note 89, at 8–10 (setting forth
proposed amendments to federal legislation in an attempt to make L3Cs more
attractive for PRIs).
104. See id. at 10.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Schmidt, supra note 101, at 170 (noting L3Cs might benefit from disclosing
their financial statements to the general public and interested investors).
108. See id. at 171 (admitting investors are currently distraught by the uncertainty
surrounding L3Cs and PRIs).
109. See Lang, Philanthropic Facilitation Act, supra note 89, at 8 (setting forth pro-
posed amendments to federal legislation in an attempt to make L3Cs more attrac-
tive for PRIs).
110. See id. at 3–8 (stating PRIs and other for-profit funding can successfully be com-
bined in L3Cs).
111. See id. (arguing a mix of for-profit and charitable funding will make L3Cs more
economically stable and sustainable).
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C. Proposed IRS Guidelines for PRIs
On April 19, 2012, the IRS released a proposed rule (Proposed
Guidelines) that lists examples of qualified PRIs as an aid to private
foundations considering the use of PRIs.112  The Proposed Guidelines
would supplement § 53.4944-3(b) of the IRS Code and would add addi-
tional examples of qualified PRIs that would not run afoul of the jeop-
ardizing investment excise tax in § 4944(a) of the IRS Code.113  IRS
Code § 53.4944-3(b) currently sets forth nine examples of qualified
PRIs, and the Proposed Guidelines offer an additional nine examples
of qualified PRIs.114  Although the Proposed Guidelines could raise
concerns among foundations regarding the use of PRIs, the Proposed
Guidelines only provide examples of PRI-qualified investments and in
no way modify the existing regulations that control PRIs.115
Several examples in the Proposed Guidelines are likely quite perti-
nent to the issue of when foundations can make PRIs in L3Cs.  The
first example describes a qualified PRI for a foundation that provides
funding to a drug manufacturer for the development of a vaccine that
otherwise would not be developed because of its low expected return
on investment.116  Another example indicates that a foundation may
make a qualified PRI by providing a low-interest loan to a business in
an area affected by a natural disaster.117  Similarly, the Proposed
Guidelines state that a foundation may provide capital to a limited
liability company that purchases coffee from poor farmers in a devel-
oping country.118  This example states that the LLC can use the loan
to train the coffee farmers, an activity it cannot do without the founda-
tion’s loan.119
112. See Examples of Program-Related Investments, 77 Fed. Reg. 23429 (proposed
Apr. 19, 2012) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 53).
113. See id. (noting the concerns and dangers foundations face when entertaining PRI
investments).
114. See id. (discussing the wide range of PRI-qualified investments available to
foundations).
115. See id. (stating the Proposed Guidelines are based on current published letter
rulings and PRI regulations).
116. See id. (describing how a foundation can buy specialized stock in a for-profit com-
pany if its investment capital is used to satisfy the PRI requirements for a quali-
fied investment).
117. See Suzanne Perry, White House Seeks to Spur Innovative Spending by Founda-
tions, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (May 10, 2012), http://philanthropy.com/article/
White-House-Seeks-to-Spur/131840/?sid=pt&utm_source=pt&utm_medium=en
(describing the Proposed Guidelines and their potential to increase the use of
PRIs).
118. See Examples of Program-Related Investments, supra note 112, at 9.
119. See id. (stating a foundation can make a qualified PRI to an LLC in the form of a
below-market-rate loan if it advances the education of poor farmers or another
qualified activity).
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The Proposed Guidelines are the first update to the PRI regulation
since its initial development in 1972; they are expected to increase
dialogue in the social community about the use of PRIs and to simplify
the process by which foundations may utilize PRIs.120  While the Pro-
posed Guidelines do not specifically mention L3Cs, they do discuss for-
profit LLCs that operate for charitable purposes and use PRIs to fur-
ther social goals.  The Proposed Guidelines thus provide specific gui-
dance to charitable foundations and L3Cs regarding contexts in which
PRIs can likely be made to L3Cs.
D. Flexibility of Tranche Investing
While L3Cs are structured to accommodate PRIs, they offer addi-
tional investment features that can allow companies to access funds
not previously available to both for-profit and nonprofit companies.
The ownership flexibility available under LLC statutes enables L3Cs
to take advantage of a multi-tiered investment strategy known as
tranche investing.121  Under normal equity-investing principles, all
investments in the L3C share the same risks and returns.122  How-
ever, a tranche system seeks to spread the levels of risk and return to
different investors.123  “The central premise of an L3C’s operation is
its use of low-cost capital in high risk ventures and its ability to allo-
cate risk and reward unevenly over a number of investors, thus ensur-
ing some a very safe investment with  market return.”124
The unique structure of LLC statutes makes tranche investing
available since membership and ownership rules are almost entirely
subject to change through an operating agreement by the members.125
The operating agreement is the “cornerstone” of each LLC because it
120. See Jonathan Greenblatt, Opening the Door for Program Related Investments,
WHITE HOUSE (May 4, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/
05/04/opening-door-program-related-investments (describing how the Proposed
Guidelines will help ease the concerns of foundations and may increase the use of
PRIs in social ventures).
121. See id.; see also REV. UNIF. LIMITED LIABILITY CO. ACT § 301(a) cmt. a, (2006)
(stating that “flexibility of management structure is a hallmark of the limited
liability company”).
122. See Bishop, supra note 7, at 245 (noting that most investors get the same rates of
return on their investments in traditional corporations).
123. See Cody Vitello, Introducing the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C):
The New Kid on the Block, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 565, 571 (2011) (stating
L3Cs can attract for-profit investors through layered or tranched member owner-
ship interests).
124. See Bishop, supra note 7, at 251 (noting that tranche investing can spread risks
and provide better rates of return for investors more concerned about financial
returns and less concerned about the social benefits created).
125. See Daniel Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on
the Low Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 910 (2010)
(recognizing that L3Cs may have substantial flexibility but also noting this flexi-
bility could create dangerous, misunderstood, and complex agreements).
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serves as the foundational contract between the entity’s owners.126
The flexibility of LLC membership statutes thus makes the L3C an
ideal vessel for tranche investing.127
Depending on the needs of the L3C, different tranche levels may
provide different levels of return for investments.128  A first tranche,
the equity tranche, contains PRIs or other investments whose inves-
tors are willing to accept a low financial return with a high risk to
fund a specific social cause.129  Investors in the equity tranche look for
a “venture with modest financial prospects, but the possibility of ma-
jor social impact.”130  This tranche of investors wants to support the
L3C’s social mission and is thus willing to sacrifice on its financial
returns.131
Investments in the equity tranche eliminate much of the financial
risk for the investors in other tranches.132  The equity tranche pro-
vides startup capital that the L3C can leverage to attract additional
investments.133  While some L3C proponents focus on obtaining foun-
dation PRIs as the basis of the equity tranche,134 PRIs might not be
the focus of many L3Cs.135  Instead, L3C businesses can focus on ob-
taining equity financing from investors looking for social returns and
some very modest financial returns when compared to those offered in
competitive markets.
126. REV. UNIF. LIMITED LIABILITY CO. ACT § 110(a).
127. See What Is the L3C?, supra note 19, at 2.  The first and most risky level of fund-
ing will be supplied by the PRI.  The PRI investment will improve the L3C’s credit
rating, which will enable it to attract more commercial investors in the next
tranche level by offering less risk and a higher return. Id.
128. See Robert Lang, Community Foundations and the L3C, AMERICANS FOR COMMU-
NITY DEV. (2010), http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/down
loads/CommunityFoundationsAndL3C.pdf.
129. See What Is the L3C?, supra note 19, at 2 (describing a tranche of investors made
up of foundations and other “social” investors).
130. Marc J. Lane, L3Cs Hold Key to Solving State’s Social Woes, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS.,
http://www.marcjlane.com/index.php?src=news&refno=288&category=2008%
20Lane%20Reports (stating there are investors who want a return on their in-
vestment but are still primarily concerned with the social impact of their
investment).
131. What Is the L3C?, supra note 19, at 2 (arguing the investments made by the “so-
cial” investors will be used to help give higher returns for investors in other
tranches seeking closer to market-rate returns).
132. See Vitello, supra note 123, at 572 (stating each tranche could offer different
levels of return and this would allow market-driven investors to receive a safer
and more market-comparable level of return on their investments).
133. See Schmidt, supra note 101, at 169 (arguing that the “social” investors will help
attract other market rate investors).
134. See Bishop, supra note 7, at 244 (noting the equity-tranche level could be com-
prised of PRIs because, by definition, these should not have a return on invest-
ment at a market-level rate).
135. See Schmidt, supra note 101, at 193 (noting that PRIs will not be an appropriate
or feasible investment tools for all L3Cs).
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A second level of funding, the mezzanine tranche, is provided by
socially conscious investors who are looking for both a modest finan-
cial return, as well as some achievement of social good.136  The mezza-
nine tranche typically offers a modest rate of return because the
equity tranche lowers the level of risk by taking little to no financial
return.137  A third tranche, the senior tranche, attracts regular inves-
tors seeking a market rate of return on their investment.138  This
market rate return is made possible through the subsidization and
risk allocation of the equity and mezzanine tranches.139
Because of the flexibility offered via its reliance on the LLC model,
L3Cs attract different types of investors and different types of invest-
ments together under the same company banner.140  The L3C taps
into new sources of capital, such as PRIs, socially responsible inves-
tors, and normal market-rate investors, and it leverages equity
tranche capital that allows the company to provide more manageable
and predictable returns to investors in the mezzanine and senior
tranches.  “Because the foundations take the highest risk at little or
no return, it essentially turns the venture capital model on its head
and gives many social enterprises a low enough cost of capital that
they are able to be self sustainable.”141
Tranche investing enables L3Cs to bring for-profit and nonprofit
investors into the same company principally by offering for-profit in-
vestors a market-level return and nonprofit investors a social return.
Ultimately, the tranche system’s flexibility allows an L3C to supple-
ment PRIs and permits the L3C to creatively structure its tranche sys-
tem to raise capital through a variety of sources.142  The first tranche
allows the L3C to attract investors in the next two tranches who might
otherwise find the social venture too risky.143
136. See Kleinberger, supra note 125, at 910 (noting that typical L3C activities cannot
generate enough return to draw in market-level investors).
137. What Is the L3C?, supra note 19, at 2 (noting the benefit of tranche investing for
L3Cs is the ability to spread out financial risk between investors seeking social
returns and those seeking financial gains).
138. See id. (describing a market rate of return tranche for traditional financial
investors).
139. See Kleinberger, supra note 125, at 910 (noting that typical L3C activities cannot
generate enough return to draw in market-level investors).
140. See Lang, The L3C and Economic Development, supra note 20 (discussing the flex-
ibility of LLC operating agreements).
141. See What Is the L3C?, supra note 19, at 2 (describing how tranche investing helps
L3Cs become more sustainable enterprises).
142. See Schmidt, supra note 101, at 169 (noting that L3Cs are not dependent on re-
ceiving PRIs).
143. See id. (stating the L3Cs double bottom line structure makes it a good candidate
for tranche investing).
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IV. LLC FIDUCIARY DUTIES: L3C ACCOUNTABILITY ISSUES
Similar to LLCs, the L3C model is both enhanced and hindered by
established laws, doctrines, and elements.  One key feature of LLC
statutes is the requirement that LLC members adhere to fiduciary
duty requirements.144  While L3C proponents have applauded the
LLC model’s flexibility and deference to membership agreements in
structuring and determining investor rights, the ability to waive fidu-
ciary duties may be a significant concern for L3C investor
protection.145
With each state passing its own LLC statute, there are a variety of
approaches to defining an LLC member’s fiduciary duty require-
ments.146  However, Delaware law, often considered the benchmark
for LLC laws, states “‘[a] fiduciary relationship is a situation where
one person reposes special trust in and reliance on the judgment of
another or where a special duty exists on the part of one person to
protect the interest of another.’”147  Furthermore, managers of an LLC
owe fiduciary duties to its members because they have discretionary
power to manage the business.148
The Supreme Court noted that identifying “that a man is a fiduci-
ary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry.  To
whom is he a fiduciary?  What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary?
In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations?  And
what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?”149  While the
managers of LLCs and L3Cs owe some fiduciary duties to their mem-
bers, it is unclear what duties apply.
144. J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C &
Other Developments in Social Entrepreneurship: The L3C Illusion: Why Low-
Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private
Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 286–87
(2010).
145. See John Tyler, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other Developments in
Social Entrepreneurship: Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A
Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 144
(2010) (noting fiduciary duties apply to L3Cs but the contractual agreement may
waive certain fiduciary duties).
146. Id. (stating the statutory sources and approaches to LLC fiduciary duties come
from a wide range of sources and that the variety of approaches can be daunting
to grasp).
147. McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987) (quoting
Cheese Shop Int’l, Inc. v. Steele, 303 A.2d 689 (Del. Ch. 1973)).
148. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2010) (“A limited liability company agree-
ment may provide for the limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for
breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member,
manager or other person to a limited liability company or to another member or
manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited
liability company agreement . . . .”).
149. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85–86 (1943).
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Delaware law allows an LLC agreement to limit or eliminate any
fiduciary duty of a member or manager to anyone also bound by the
LLC agreement.150  However, the LLC agreement cannot eliminate
the fiduciary duties of the covenant of good faith or fair dealing.151  In
January 2012, the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Auriga
Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC clarified the role of LLC fiduci-
ary duties.152  The Auriga court held that default fiduciary duties ap-
ply to LLCs unless they are contractually altered, and that LLC
managers thus owe LLC members a duty of loyalty, care, and good
faith and fair dealing.153
These fiduciary duties are designed and understood to protect the
LLC’s members from nefarious dealings by the LLC’s controlling
members or managers.  However, in the context of the L3C, these fidu-
ciary duties may create conflicts of interest when the financial inter-
ests of the L3C’s members are in conflict with the business’s social
mission.154  One way to handle the fiduciary duty issue is to address it
in the L3C operating agreement.155  However, if the operating agree-
ment releases the L3C from too many fiduciary duties it also reduces
the protections available to investors.156  In addition, if the L3C in-
volves too many special fiduciary duties that favor its social mission,
profit-motivated investors may feel marginalized.157  Operating
agreements should thus be designed in a manner that carefully bal-
ances the potential conflict between an L3C’s mission and the needs of
its investors.
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (2010) (“[A] limited liability company agreement
may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad
faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.”).
151. Id.
152. 40 A.3d 839 (2012) (holding that a controlling member of an LLC breached his
fiduciary duties to minority members when he misled the board as to the value of
the company, discouraged potential buyers from purchasing the company, set up
a sham auction, and purchased the LLC at an amount that was far below fair
market value).
153. Id. at 851–53 (holding that managing members of an LLC had affirmative fiduci-
ary duties to all minority members unless these duties were specifically altered
in the operating agreement).
154. See Callison & Vestal, supra note 144, at 287–88 (explaining potential conflicts
resulting from the implied fiduciary duties inherent in L3Cs).
155. Id. (discussing the use of operating agreements to vary the fiduciary duties owed
to L3C members).
156. Id. (describing how an L3C operating agreement can change the managing mem-
bers’ fiduciary duties in favor of the L3C’s social mission and social investors).
157. Id. (stating that the pro-social mission fiduciary duties set forth in the operating
agreement “increase[d] the difficulty, and the risk, of attracting profit-motivated
L3C investment[s]”).
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V. THE L3C BRAND
In a 2007 study, social entrepreneurs listed raising capital and pro-
moting their business as the two primary challenges to their compa-
nies’ success.158  These entrepreneurs further indicated that they
must create a recognizable brand for hybrid social ventures to in-
crease both financial support from funders and investors and general
awareness from consumers and other relevant stakeholders.159  Pro-
ponents of the L3C envision creating a brand for the L3C that signifies
“to the world that it puts mission before profit yet is self-sus-
taining.”160  The L3C offers a chance to brand the business so that it is
known for a dual mission.161
For the L3C brand to be effective, the market must perceive sub-
stantial value in what the L3C offers.162  Proponents argue that much
of the L3C’s value is derived from its use as a brand that signals that
the business embraces a social-responsibility model.163  The brand
thus helps increase funding to L3Cs by encouraging the frequent use of
PRIs and tranche investing to raise capital.164  Yet by designing the
L3C under existing LLC laws, the L3C is able to take advantage of
decades of court opinions and legislation enacted around LLCs.165
The L3C is thus able to use the legal reliability of an LLC while simul-
taneously creating its own brand.
158. See ALLIANZ ET AL., GROWING OPPORTUNITY: ENTREPRENEURIAL SOLUTIONS TO IN-
SOLUBLE PROBLEMS 5 (2007), available at https://www.allianz.com/media/current/
en/press/news/studies/downloads/skoll_study_social_entrepreneurs.pdf?search.
query=Insoluble (noting that social entrepreneurships often struggle raising the
capital they need to be successful and self-sustaining).
159. Id. at 19–20 (arguing a well-branded hybrid business form could increase funding
for social enterprises).
160. See Daniel Kleinberger, When the Law Is Understood—L3C No (William Mitchell
Coll. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1568373 (arguing the L3C
model is unnecessary because LLCs already provide all of the advantages of an
L3C).
161. See Schmidt, supra note 101, at 183 (stating one major benefit of the L3C is the
ability to brand the business form as a socially driven for-profit enterprise).
162. See Kleinberger, supra note 125, at 908–09 (noting the market needs to see value
in L3Cs for them to be successful).
163. See Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies: An Un-
likely Marriage of For-Profit Entities and Private Foundations, TAX MGMT., EST.,
GIFTS & TR. J., Aug. 2009, at 1.
164. See What Is the L3C?, supra note 19, at 2 (pushing the use of L3Cs to encourage
more PRIs).
165. See Lang, The L3C and Economic Development, supra note 20, at 4 (articulating
the benefits associated with branding the L3C under the flexible LLC statutes).
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VI. LEGAL PROTECTION FOR L3C INVESTORS
Although an L3C investor has the same legal rights as an LLC in-
vestor, there are no additional protections in place to specifically pro-
tect L3C investors.  However, LLC “exit right” statutes and L3C
membership agreements can provide added protection for L3C mem-
bers.  For example, L3Cs created in Vermont are subject to Title 11,
Chapter 21 of the Vermont Code, which states that LLC members may
dissociate from an LLC at will.166  In addition, a member’s distribu-
tional interest must be purchased by the LLC at fair market value at
the time of the dissociation.167  Many states, however, have foreclosed
these protections by amending their LLC statutes to restrict LLC
members from invoking dissociation and buy-out rights.168
In addition to exit rights, L3C investors, like private foundations,
may need ownership controls to safeguard their PRIs and the L3C’s
charitable mission, such as super-voting, veto power, or other negoti-
ated approval rights.169  However, in order to protect their financial
investments, for-profit investors may require a “first money out” pro-
vision, which specifies that for-profit investors are to be paid before
private foundations and lower-return social investors.170  Without a
properly negotiated membership agreement, L3C investors may be
“locked”171 into an L3C with no way to liquidate their investment.172
Because L3Cs do not have the liquidity of publicly traded compa-
nies or partnerships, L3C investors will need to protect their invest-
ments through precisely worded membership operating agreements.
However, some states statutorily forbid the use of dissociation and
buy-out rights,173 meaning that even a well-prepared L3C investor
166. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3082 (West 2010) (permitting dissolution and member
withdrawal from an LLC to occur quickly).
167. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3091 (West 2010).
168. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression The Limited Liability Company: Learn-
ing (Or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883,
937–39 (2005) (articulating different state laws addressing LLC exit rights).
169. See Susan A. Maslow & Timothy White, Enlightened Capitalism and L3Cs, N.J.
LAW., Apr. 2010, at 63, 64, available at www.njsba.com (describing ways to pro-
tect LLC members and social investments).
170. See id. (noting that L3C financial investors need to have their own types of protec-
tions because their interests could be opposed to the best interests of social
investors).
171. See Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and Dissolution
Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability
Company?, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 417 (noting that some LLC agreements
may not allow for easy dissolution of membership rights).
172. See Tanya Simpson, Have Estate Planners Hijacked the LLC? How Restrictions
on Dissolution Have Crippled the LLC As a Viable Small Business Entity, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 573, 577 (stating many LLC members have no way out of the
agreement and cannot sell their ownership shares).
173. See id. (noting that state statutes vary with regards to LLC exit and dissolution
rights).
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will not be able to negotiate for buy-out rights in a membership agree-
ment in all circumstances.  Ultimately, this could lead the investor to
reject an otherwise suitable L3C investment opportunity because the
membership agreement or the state’s LLC statutes cannot adequately
protect the investor.
VII. NEED FOR INCREASED GOVERNMENT REGULATION
AND OVERSIGHT
While state laws generally require L3Cs to incorporate and adhere
to the three requirements for a PRI,174 rarely does government moni-
toring exist to ensure the L3C follows these requirements.  Indeed,
only Vermont and Illinois provide oversight that could plausibly be
considered L3C monitoring.  Any L3C operating in the state of Illinois
is required to register with the state attorney general’s Charitable
Trust Bureau and is subject to the regulatory authority of the attorney
general.175  When an L3C registers, its potential investors are given
free access to information about the L3C’s income, assets, expendi-
tures, programs, and administration.176  Similarly, in March of 2010,
the Vermont assistant attorney general sent a letter to all Vermont
L3Cs requesting the voluntary disclosure of information about the
L3C’s activities and finances.177  While Vermont does not require L3Cs
to disclose financial information, voluntary disclosure can help the
government better monitor the L3Cs.
The remaining state governments provide very little monitoring of
L3Cs, thus exposing investors to needless uncertainty and potentially
inhibiting federal lawmakers from granting L3Cs preferential treat-
ment as PRI recipients.178  States could, however, easily monitor L3Cs
by requiring them to register and provide annual financial reports to
the state’s attorney general and the public.179  In addition, states
could limit the manner in which L3Cs use their charitable assets,180
especially in instances where an attorney general requires that the
174. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001(27) (West 2010).
175. See Norah Jones & Krupa Shah, L3Cs: What Are They and What Should Private
Foundations Know About Them?, QUARLES & BRADY LLP (Jan. 2010), http://
www.quarles.com/publications/Detail.aspx?publication=610 (stating L3Cs in Il-
linois must report to the attorney general).
176. See Doeringer, supra note 99, at 15.
177. See Letter from Elliot Berg, Vermont Assistant Attorney General, to L3C Advi-
sors (March 25, 2010), available at http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.
org/downloads/VermontAttyGeneralLtr.pdf.
178. See Doeringer, supra note 99, at 14 (arguing the lack of state oversight will limit
the ability of federal lawmakers to back L3Cs as preferential PRI recipients).
179. See Marc J. Lane, L3C and Charitable Trust, NONPROFIT L. BLOG (Apr. 22, 2010),
http://www.nonprofitlawblog.com/home/2010/04/l3c-and-charitable-trust.html
(noting that public disclosure of financial statements could be a possible registra-
tion oversight tool used by states to regulate L3Cs).
180. See id.
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L3C give notice or seek approval for any major corporate changes, such
as “a merger, sale of substantially all of its assets, or dissolution.”181
Such regulation can help to ensure that L3Cs use their assets only for
their stated primary social purposes.
VIII. DOUBLE BOTTOM LINE SUCCESS—COMMUNITY
INTEREST COMPANIES
The CIC and the L3C are both hybrid business models designed to
serve a primary social function with profit-making as a secondary
function.  The CIC has existed for a few more years than the L3C and
has had significantly more success.  The biggest difference between
CICs and L3Cs is that CICs are far more regulated by government.
Under the British system of government regulation and oversight,
CICs have expanded and flourished into multimillion pound indus-
tries serving thousands of people across a broad range of social and
charitable missions.
The British government, in an attempt to make more capital avail-
able to nonprofits, relaxed the nondistribution restraints on nonprofits
to create the Community Interest Company (CIC).182  CICs are “first
and foremost a limited company carrying on a social activity and must
be viable as such.”183  The CIC form was passed into law under the
Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise Act of 2004.184  The
CIC was created with the idea that such companies would be self-sus-
taining businesses that would both make contributions to the commu-
nity and provide limited returns to their investors.185  CICs are
intended to be profit-making companies.186  However, they may rely
on grants and donations to provide returns to investors and the com-
181. See id. (referring to the Illinois Charitable Trust Act, which imposes restrictions
on L3Cs by declaring the L3C chief operating officer as a “trustee” and thereby
requiring L3Cs to meet multiple obligations imposed by the Charitable Trust
Act).
182. See Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L.
REV. 2017, 2041 (2007) (noting the U.K. created the CIC to open up capital to
social enterprises).
183. See REGULATOR OF CMTY. INTEREST CO., INFORMATION PACK: COMMUNITY INTER-
EST COMPANY, 2010, available at http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/CICleaflets/
CIC%20INFORMATION%20PACK%20V00.04%20Final.pdf [hereinafter REGU-
LATOR, INFORMATION PACK].
184. See COMPANIES (AUDIT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE) ACT, 2004,
c. 27 (U.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/27/part/2 (set-
ting forth the statute enabling the use of CICs).
185. See REGULATOR, INFORMATION PACK, supra note 183, at 5 (arguing that by open-
ing up funding for social enterprises, the government made these businesses
more self-sustaining).
186. See id. (noting that while a CIC is developed primarily for a social purpose, it has
a secondary goal of making money in order to keep the company self-sustaining).
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munity.187  Thus, while CICs may receive funding in the form of dona-
tions, they are expected to be able to generate sufficient income to
cover all operating costs.188
The CIC Act also created the Regulator of CICs (the Regulator), an
independent statutory office holder appointed by the Secretary of
State, to encourage CIC branding, development, and execution.189
The Regulator is charged with determining if a company is eligible to
be a CIC and overseeing any major business decisions made by the
CIC, including the distribution of dividends and the disposal of as-
sets.190  The Regulator also ensures that the business maintains con-
formity to the statutory requirements.191
States could provide similar oversight from either an attorney gen-
eral or from a specifically created L3C regulator to ensure that L3Cs
are properly following their stated social purpose.  Government moni-
toring could also help determine whether or not the L3C is properly
using its resources in order to achieve its social mission.  Such regula-
tion would help build investor security and confidence by requiring
L3Cs to utilize their resources in pursuit of their stated social mission.
The CIC, like the L3C, does not receive the traditional tax breaks
awarded to nonprofits.192  The CIC is set up as a limited liability com-
pany, but it has a variety of statutory and legal features that are dis-
tinct from for-profit companies.193  The CIC faces increased
transparency, an asset lock, restrictions on dividends, governance by
the Regulator, and requirements to provide a community benefit.194
The CIC is required to be more transparent than a for-profit company
by filing its annual report with the Regulator as a public record docu-
ment open for public scrutiny.195  It is required to report the aggre-
gate pay of its directors and highest paid director196 to prevent
187. See id. (noting that reliance on donations can help the CICs to deliver higher
rates of return to financial investors).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 7 (designating a statutory regulator to oversee the success and develop-
ment of CICs).
190. See id. at 7–8 (stating that one of the Regulator’s duties is to ensure the distribu-
tions of profits do not violate the CIC investors’ rights).
191. See id. (noting the Regulator oversees and enforces the legal requirements of a
CIC).
192. See Malani & Posner, supra note 182, at 2034 (stating for-profit companies do not
receive the same tax breaks as do nonprofits but indicating this could change as
hybrid companies emerge).
193. See CMT’Y INTEREST COS. REGULATOR, THE CIC REGULATOR CASE STUDY SERIES:
THE BENEFITS OF A COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANY (CIC), 2010, (U.K.), http://
www.cicregulator.gov.uk/CICleaflets/benefitsofacicleaflet.pdf (differentiating a
CIC from a for-profit corporation and a nonprofit).
194. See id. at 2 (setting forth some of the many CIC investor protection mechanisms).
195. See id. at 1 (setting forth the reporting requirements for CICs).
196. Malani & Posner, supra note 182, at 2039 (setting forth the disclosure require-
ments for CICs).
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windfall payments.197  The CIC must also report how it has helped the
community and how it has involved its stakeholders in these ven-
tures.198  In addition, the CIC must declare what dividends it paid
and any information on the transfer of its assets.199  These require-
ments make the CIC more transparent to investors, thereby increas-
ing investor confidence that the company is acting properly.200
Similarly, if the L3C was required to disclose more information to in-
vestors, such as dividends paid and any transfer of assets, an antici-
pated effect would be to raise investor confidence by increasing the
business’s operational transparency.
A CIC’s assets are further regulated through a system called an
“asset lock.”201  The asset lock prevents a CIC from selling its assets to
a for-profit firm unless it receives full market value.202  The asset lock
was put in place to ensure that the CIC uses its assets and profits for
the community’s benefit.203  It comforts investors who want reassur-
ance that the CIC continues to run both its business and social
operations.204
Another important aspect of the asset lock system is the restriction
on CIC dividend payments.205  CICs are restricted from giving out
large financial dividends, which helps to strike a balance between en-
couraging investments in the CIC and making sure the CIC reinvests
its profits to serve the community.206  By statute, dividends may only
be paid if authorized by the Regulator.207  Once the Regulator ap-
proves a dividend payment, there are still three important
restrictions:208
197. See REGULATOR, INFORMATION PACK, supra note 183 (stating strict disclosure re-
quirements protect the CIC from being financially drained through unnecessary
financial distributions).
198. See Malani & Posner, supra note 182, at 2038 (stating that CICs are required to
advertise and disclose their social impact).
199. See id. at 2039 (noting CICs have strict disclosure requirements).
200. See id. (describing the benefits of CIC transparency).
201. See REGULATOR, INFORMATION PACK, supra note 183, at 14 (describing the asset
lock system of protecting CIC investments and assets from financial greed).
202. Id. (stating the reasons underlying the asset lock system).
203. Id.
204. Malcolm Lynch, For and Against the Community Interest Company, INVESTMENT
MATTERS, Jan. 2004, at 1 (noting the CIC’s strict asset protection mechanisms
helps ease investor concerns).
205. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 635 (stating that the CICs are limited regarding how
much they can distribute through dividends each year).
206. See REGULATOR, INFORMATION PACK, supra note 183, at 14 (describing how the
dividend limit forces the CIC to reinvest into its social mission).
207. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 635 (noting the Regulator oversees all dividend
payments).
208. See id. (stating the Regulator and CIC are further bound by statutory require-
ments regulating dividend disbursements).
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
3397-neb_92-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A      12/12/2013   14:12:17
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-2\NEB203.txt unknown Seq: 29  2-DEC-13 14:28
2013] REGULATION OF L3Cs 287
1. The dividend may not exceed 5% of the Bank of England base
lending rate of the paid-up value of a share;209
2. The aggregate dividend cap is set at 35% of distributable prof-
its;210 and
3. Unused dividend capacity can only be carried forward for five
years.211  When the dividend restrictions are viewed together
with the asset lock, investors are only given rights to limited
dividends and are not given access to the CIC’s full profits.212
L3Cs offer more flexibility than CICs in their self-governance and
financing because L3Cs are not constantly monitored and guided by a
government regulator.213  However, the CIC regulations and over-
sight by the Regulator afford more structure and certainty for poten-
tial investors than are provided by the relaxed L3C regulations.214
The asset lock, dividend cap, and Regulator protect social investors
and better ensure that the company continues to provide a social bene-
fit.  An asset lock system could help ensure that L3Cs do not gouge
companies for financial profit while ignoring their primary stated so-
cial purposes.  Additionally, an asset lock system could also increase
investor confidence by ensuring that any investment in the L3C would
remain in the L3C to help achieve the company’s stated social goal.  A
dividend cap could help ensure that the L3C reinvests in itself and
thereby extends its social reach, instead of returning substantial prof-
its to investors.  Finally, the designation of an L3C regulator could
help ensure that the L3C is following the three PRI statutory require-
ments.  This increased transparency and monitoring would likely give
investors greater confidence in the social venture and may provide
foundations for determining PRI-qualified recipients.
IX. STRENGTHENING THE L3C FORM
With more than 800 registered L3C companies in nine states, the
L3C is becoming a part of the social entrepreneur landscape.  While
critics and governance issues remain, the continued adoption of L3Cs
demonstrates the value that investors and social entrepreneurs see in
the hybrid model.  The flexibility of tranche investing and the appeal
of the L3C brand have enabled businesses to utilize for-profit and non-
209. REGULATOR, INFORMATION PACK, supra note 183, at 16.  (Any shares given out
after April 6, 2010, will be able to receive 20% instead of 5%.).
210. See id. (setting a cap at 35% of profits).
211. See id. (stating unused dividends can only be carried forward for five years, pro-
tecting investors against long carried out dividends).
212. See Reiser, supra note 14, at 636 (noting investors cannot access all of a CIC’s
profits).
213. See id. at 636 (noting the difference in flexibility between L3Cs and CICs).
214. See id. (describing the stricter regulation and success of CICs as compared to
L3Cs).
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profit investors by offering varying rates of social and financial re-
turns.  This double bottom line model has increased the levels of
financing available to social entrepreneurs and has created a new
fourth sector outside the traditional three: nonprofit, for-profit, and
government.
The lack of government incentives and regulation, however, have
inhibited the growth of L3Cs.  Although the L3C model was created in
hopes of enticing foundations to invest in socially driven businesses
through PRIs, they rarely actually attract PRIs because investors are
still wary of the tax consequences of these investments.  PRIs are un-
likely to become a common source of financing for L3Cs unless state
and federal laws explicitly grant L3Cs preferential treatment as quali-
fied PRI-recipients.  Furthermore, with the exception of Illinois, L3Cs
do not face any special governmental oversight and regulation.  The
lack of L3C-specific regulation leaves uncertainties with respect to
PRIs and investor rights.  Without further government regulation, in-
vestors can be left without remedy when L3Cs fail to follow their
stated primary social purposes.  In the absence of properly formulated
membership agreements, these investors can be stuck indefinitely in a
bad investment with no way to liquidate their holdings.  Without more
regulation and oversight of L3Cs, investors will probably remain reluc-
tant to invest because they lack adequate protections for their funds.
While the L3C has been steadily adopted by hundreds of companies
in multiple states, Great Britain’s CICs have been more successful.
Although CICs and L3Cs are both for-profit companies primarily or-
ganized for social purposes, Great Britain’s CIC model illustrates how
government regulation and oversight can enhance investor confidence
in hybrid social enterprises.  The U.K.’s regulation of CICs through an
asset lock, a dividend cap, and a CIC Regulator protects investors, en-
sures that CICs remain focused on their primary charitable purposes,
and provides CIC transparency to potential investors and the
government.
Great Britain’s regulation of CICs provides an excellent example of
how states could more effectively monitor and regulate L3Cs as hybrid
social ventures.  State regulations, such as Illinois’s requirement for
L3Cs to register with the attorney general, are examples of L3C gov-
ernance that could easily be modified to provide the advantageous en-
hancements of an asset lock, dividend cap, and a regulator.  However,
such features need to be generally required.  L3Cs also need greater
oversight.  Regulations that increase transparency would help protect
and facilitate investment and advance the efforts to convince the IRS
and Congress to adopt L3C-friendly PRI legislation.
